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Transboundary Networking in Catalonia
JOUNI HÄKLI
Introduction
Several interesting trends regarding the political-economic and cultural
transformation of the European borderlands are coming together in the northeast of
the Spanish peninsula. The autonomous region of Catalonia features active co-
operation with other European regions both near and far and serves as an exemplary
case of political leaders and other prominent actors finding networking a good
strategy for increasing the region’s economic performance, political power, and
cultural sustainability. Catalonia is also one of the European regions directly
influenced by the political and economic drive for a borderless Europe. Since the
inception of the Single European Market in January 1993, people and goods have
freely crossed the Franco-Spanish state boundary (Grant 1998). Furthermore,
Catalonia  is  currently  one  of  the  most  prosperous  regions  in  Spain,  with  a  strong
political autonomy negotiated with and against the Spanish central government
(Guibernau 1997; Mouqué 1999).
It is hardly surprising, then, that much in the same way as north central Italy is
at times viewed as the showcase of network economy, Catalonia has become a model
for possible future political developments in Europe (Cooke 1989; Cossentino 1996;
Keating 1996). This interest is inspired not only by the region’s current vitality and
unique historical development but also by the discourses of new regionalism and the
changing nation-state in the face of economic globalisation and intergovernmental co-
operation. Probably the most explicit treatment of Catalonia as model is presented in
Castells's (1997) influential book The Power of Identity. Castells identifies Catalonia
as a nation without a state, yet in ‘search for a new kind of state [which] would be a
state of variable geometry, bringing together respect for the historically inherited
Spanish state with the growing autonomy of Catalan institutions’.
In other words, Catalonia represents a break with traditional nationalism
striving for a separate nation-state. Rather than irredentism as such, it aims at
integration with a broader entity, which is not only the European Union, but ‘various
networks of regional and municipal governments, as well as of civic associations’.
These multiple horizontal relationships represent a new social organisation emerging
‘under the tenuous shell of modern nation-state’ (Castells 1997: 50).
In Castells’s (1997: 50) view, the Catalan case is particularly significant
because it is a ‘historical innovation’. The Catalan political and cultural autonomy is
extended through ‘the networking of power sharing institutions’, not through
contestation of the Spanish territorial sovereignty. Castells (1997: 50) concludes that
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this model ‘seems to relate better than traditional notions of sovereignty to a society
based on flexibility and adaptability, to a global economy, to networking of media, to
the variation and interpenetration of cultures’. Thus as a society of borderless trade,
cultural identity, and flexible government institutions, the Catalans are perhaps the
‘chosen people’ of the information age.
In  this  chapter  my intention  is  to  evaluate  some of  the  arguments  about  the
European and global political transformations by looking at the processes of cross-
border regionalisation in Catalonia (see figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 Regions of Catalonia (Catalunya), Midi-Pyrénées, and Languedoc-Roussillon at the
Franco-Spanish boundary (Source: Modified from the Atles de’lEuroregio 1995).
With emphasis on one particular context among the European borderlands, I seek to
critically assess the thesis of a growing disconnection between territory and national
identity and the disappearance of borders as a result of increasing cross-border
networking by governmental and economic actors. By analysing a peaceful European
internal state border, I aim to assess the degree to which the networks for cross-
border co-operation, functioning mainly in the realm of politics and administration,
are actually capable of mobilising the broader population for an emerging cross-
border regional identity. Thus, my main analytic focus is the tension (or lack of it)
between the ongoing networking across the Franco-Spanish border and the everyday
perceptions of territory among the broader population. The latter perspective is
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especially helpful for assessing the idea of de-territorialising national identities in the
context of a substate nationalism (for discussion of de-territorialised nationalism and
cosmopolitan identities, see Kaldor 1996: 43; Cheach and Robbins 1998).
The chapter begins with an outline of the historical and political context
within  which  cross-border  regionalisation  unfolds  in  Catalonia.  I  then  chart  present
networking activities, understanding that they reflect a strategy for the participating
actors to expand their capacity of governance (Le Galés 1998; Häkli 1999). I analyse
these activities in the light of the results of an interview questionnaire mapping the
attitudes of ‘borderlanders’ towards cross-border co-operation, the development of a
borderless future, and the other side of the border. In theoretical terms, I seek to
evaluate the relevance of network as a metaphor describing political and cultural
changes and challenging the power of national identities in contemporary Europe.
A Short Political History of Catalonia
It is difficult to understand the particular cultural and political situation of Catalonia,
or the claims made about the region’s broader relevance, without a brief historical
reminder. However, as there are several well-written introductions to Catalan
political history available (Sahlins 1998), I concentrate mainly on aspects that are
relevant from the point of view of cross-border co-operation in the Catalan
borderlands.
Catalan historiography lists various possible moments of birth for the
political-cultural unit called Catalunya. Earliest references are made to the tenth
century, when the region separated from the Carolingian Empire (Castells 1997: 43).
Catalan political consciousness manifests itself at latest in the fourteenth century,
when the term Principat de Catalunya appears in legal use for the first time (Brunn
1992: 134). Yet other moments of birth have been singled out, dated roughly to the
Middle Ages (Pi-Sunyer 1980). However, perhaps more interesting than the
(mythical) point of origin are events that have led to the territorial shaping of the
Catalan borderlands.
In the fourteenth century, Catalonia was a distinct and vibrant Mediterranean
trade centre with rather advanced representative institutions. Its language and
literature were well-developed already when it formed a kingdom, the crown of
Aragon, with its neighbouring regions of Aragon and Valencia. From this time dates
the concept of a Catalan linguistic and cultural area, els Països Catalans (the Catalan
lands), which today covers not only the Autonomous Community of Catalonia but
also the northern parts of Valencia, the eastern parts of Aragon, the Balearic Islands,
the Principality of Andorra, the French Roussillon, and the Sardinian town of Alghero
(see figure 5.2) (Brunn 1992: 134).
The Crown of Aragon merged with the kingdom of Castile in the late fifteenth
century  through  the  marriage  of  Ferdinand,  king  of  Aragon,  and  Isabella,  queen  of
Castile. Although the unification was supposed to respect the Catalan language,
culture, and institutions, over the next two centuries the Spanish state and Castilian
culture made significant inroads in Catalonia (Laitin, Sole, and Kalyvas 1994: 9). In
1640, Catalan nobility in alliance with France joined with some of their rebellious
peasants in a revolt (the Revolt of the Reapers) against the Castilian domination. The
revolt was suppressed, and when peace between Spain and France was finally
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established in 1659, the Catalan province of Roussillon and a portion of the Cerdanya
valley (today’s Catalunya Nord) were annexed to France (Pi-Sunyer 1980: 106).
Thus, the Franco-Spanish boundary, currently crossed by various networks of co-
operation, was set up in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 and erected gradually by
the late eighteenth century.
Figure 5.2. Catalan linguistic and cultural area, els Països Catalans.
The end of Catalonia as a politically and legally distinct entity occurred only in the
early eighteenth century, at the conclusion of the Spanish War of Succession, in
which the Catalans again stood against Madrid, this time with the Austrians.
Catalonia was defeated, and the new Castilian government erased the region's
remaining privileges (Castells 1997: 45). Surprisingly, the surrender of Barcelona on
September 11, 1714, is now celebrated as the Catalan national day. The ensuing rule
by the Castilian central powers narrowed significantly the official use of the Catalan
language, but the Church retained the right to use Catalan, which could also be freely
used in social intercourse. The latter two pockets of freedom proved important for
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the reproduction of Catalan language and culture, the cornerstones of Catalan
nationalism, emerging as a mass movement between the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
The lack of political self-government notwithstanding, during the nineteenth
century Catalonia, and especially the city and province of Barcelona, assumed a key
position as the leading industrial region in Spain. The region’s prospering textile
industry and well-developed commercial tradition had their roots in the
Mediterranean trade since the Middle Ages. Industrialisation had far-reaching
consequences  for  political  and  cultural  life  in  Catalonia.  First,  it  drove  the  region’s
culture  and  lifestyles  farther  apart  from the  rest  of  Spain.  While  the  majority  of  the
country was heavily dependent on agricultural production and had a traditional land-
owning upper class, Catalonia developed new industrial jobs and a rising bourgeoisie
(Brunn 1992: 135). Second, industrialisation freed a growing number of people from
traditional ties and habits and fostered their integration into new forms of social
communication, groupings, and organisations. This was instrumental for the
construction of civil society and modern political community in Catalonia, which
provided the necessary seedbed for the Catalan movement. Third, extensive industrial
production and trade relations connected Catalonia to the outside world in a manner
that was not typical of the rest of Spain (Pi-Sunyer 1980: 107–8). The contemporary
forms of integration and networking as outward-looking activities thus lean on a
strong tradition in Catalonia.
Economic prosperity and the rising bourgeoisie encouraged the rise of
modern nationalism in Catalonia by the beginning of the twentieth century (Garcia-
Ramon and Nogué-Font 1994). According to Catalan historiography, the Catalan
language and culture survived nineteenth century repression by the Central Powers,
and the rising national movement was successful in strengthening the status of
Catalan political institutions and language (Capdeferro 1967). In the 1932
constitutional reform Catalonia re-established autonomous status and gained its own
parliamentary government, the Generalitat de Catalunya. However, the bloody Civil
War and the accession of power by General Franco in 1939 again marked the
withdrawal of Catalan autonomy for nearly four decades. The death of Franco in
1975 saw the re-establishment of democracy in Spain and gave rise to the 1978
Spanish Constitution. The new constitution recognised and guaranteed the right to
autonomy of the ‘nationalities and regions forming Spain’, and set up the
Autonomous Communities System (Guibernau 1997: 95).
As one of the Spanish autonomous communities, Catalonia has since the late
1970s gradually strengthened its political and cultural autonomy through the
leadership of Jordi Pujol, the long-time president of the Generalitat. The ‘official
discourse’, as promoted by Pujol and inscribed into the 1979 Catalan Statute of
Autonomy, explicitly makes reference to Catalan territory, history, culture,
institutions, and language as the markers of differentiation from others (Guibernau
1997: 95–96). Together with particular symbols, such as the Catalan flag, these are
the elements that the Catalan nationalist discourse has successfully established as the
emblems and constituents of the Catalan identity.
Although there is little reason to doubt the historical accuracy of this
narrative, we would do well to pay attention to Michael Billig’s (1995) warnings
against the modernisation of history in nationalistic terms. From the fact that a
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particular Catalan-speaking nobility emerged in the Middle Ages, acting in the name
of Catalunya and its rulers, one cannot draw the conclusion that there existed a
national community of Catalans in the modern sense, that is, a community of
laypeople, peasantry, craftsmen, nobility, and merchants all defining themselves as
one group. In fact, as is the case in most nations, the Catalan identity emerged among
the broader population only after the rise of compulsory school education, mass
media, industrial division of labour, and social movements (Pi-Sunyer 1980: 107; see
also Paasi 1996). The fact that various vernacular tongues, Catalan among them,
have existed in different parts of Europe hardly supports the idea of a nationally
divided continent before the age of the nation-states and the particularly modern
forms of collective life. Research on national identities has clearly shown that
languages do not create nationalism so much as nationalism creates languages
(Anderson 1991). Although all national languages are ancient human creations, their
significance as anchors of collective identity and taken-for-granted ‘boundary
markers’ between groups is of much more recent origin in the modern world of
nation-states (Billig 1995: 30). The Catalan language was codified grammatically
only in the early twentieth century, at the time of rising Catalan nationalism (Castells
1997: 45). It is at once a historical reality and a modern construct.
Yet contemporary Catalan national identity cannot be reduced to the claim
that it is invented, of recent origin, or merely a social construct. For most Catalans
the existence of a Catalan nation is a reality beyond question. The ‘official’
historiography is part and parcel of this conviction and cannot be measured against a
truer, more original, or authentic Catalan history. But it is equally clear that national
historiographies are not politically innocent because they legitimate the idea of the
world consisting of enduring and distinctive political-cultural units. Catalan
historiography is no exception, but adding to its particular character, it is said to be
somewhat ambiguous in its relation to territoriality (Douglass 1998: 96). Brunn
(1992: 134) notes that the Catalan movement sees itself as being mostly defined by
linguistic and cultural factors, which can be mapped to els Països Catalans. Yet the
Catalan Statute of Autonomy sets up the political territory of Catalonia as limited to
the area consisting of the four provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and
Tarragona, which form the Autonomous Community of Catalonia (Guibernau 1997:
96). This is remarkable in the sense that it creates a constant tension between the
extension of the linguistic-cultural area forming the (real and imagined) roots of
Catalan identity and the territorial extension of the region’s political power. It could
be assumed that some of the actual networking in Catalonia can be accounted for by
the fact that these two Catalan territorialities are not coincident.
Cross-Border Networking in Catalonia
Considering the political history of the region, together with its contemporary
strong economic, cultural, and political status, it would be tempting to view cross-
border co-operation in Catalonia as a conscious effort and means to correct certain
historical injustices. This interpretation finds support in the Catalan Statute of
Autonomy, which states that the collaboration and cultural exchange with other self-
governing communities and provinces is to be encouraged and special attention given
to all those with which Catalonia has had particular historical, cultural, or commercial
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links (Catalan Statute of Autonomy 1986: 39). Furthermore, the statute recognises
the Catalan language as the heritage of other territories and communities and outlines
the possibility of the establishment of cultural relations with states where such
territories are located and such communities reside (Guibernau 1997: 96). However,
due to the obvious sensitivity of such relations among Catalan-speaking territories,
the statute only refers to cultural relations and explicitly denies the possibility of
political association.
This is the political and geographic context in which networking and co-
operation across the Franco-Spanish border take place. The border is the result of a
peace treaty some three centuries ago, annexing Catalan-speaking areas to France.
Today the annexed areas are known as Catalunya Nord in Catalonia and Catalogne
in France, and they form a part of the ‘greater Catalonia’, els Països Catalans.
Cultural relations of co-operation are officially recognised as the goal of the Catalan
Generalitat (Catalan Statute of Autonomy 1986: 39). However, the Spanish
Constitution implicitly circumscribes the nature of such relations to the nonpolitical
(Guibernau 1997: 98), which means that Catalan politicians and the Generalitat will
have to balance carefully between the policies of the Spanish government and the
wishes of their own constituency (Ross 1996: 498).
In  October  1991  the  leaders  of  Catalonia  and  the  two  French  regions  of
Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées signed an agreement (Carta de
l’Euroregió) establishing an institutional framework for the various forms of co-
operation that had emerged between the regions since the early 1980s (Euroregió
1994). While the Euroregió Catalunya, Languedoc-Rousillon i Midi-Pyrénées is not
the first official agreement on cross-border co-operation involving both the Spanish
and the French Catalonias, it is perhaps the most visible and significant one. The two
main goals of the Euroregion are (1) to develop methods for increasing interaction
between the economic, social, and cultural actors in the region, and  (2) to strengthen
the  role  of  this  Euroregion  as  a  motor  for  the  European  economy,  together  with
fostering European integration and strengthening the position of Southern European
regions  (Euroregió 1994). In practice, Euroregion co-operation aims at concerted
action by the constituent regions within the European Union bodies, as well as
securing the support and acceptance of the Spanish and French governments for its
large-scale projects. The latter is of particular importance because the respective
states have often regarded actual cross-border co-operation with suspicion. One
example is the states’ lack of support for the high-speed train connection (El Punt
1992).
Euroregion activities involve the leaders of the three regions in an annual
conference (Conferencia dels Presidents) that co-ordinates and sets the main lines for
Euroregion co-operation. A committee formed by leading administrators and
specialists representing all regions oversees the realisation of the plan accepted in the
presidential conference and sets up particular activities in sectoral working groups.
The Comité Tripartit de Coordinació is also responsible for the Euroregion’s budget.
The actual co-operation is carried out by working groups (grups de treball)
operating within six sectors: (1) traffic, infrastructure, and telecommunication; (2)
enterprises, business life, and vocational training; (3) education, research, and the
transfer of technology; (4) agriculture, fishing, and water supply; (5) culture, tourism,
youth, and sports; and (6) environment and consumer guidance (Euroregió document
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estadístic 1993). The working groups are composed of officials qualified in the
respective areas, so that all three regions are represented in all groups, and each
region is responsible for the co-ordination of two working groups. Catalonia runs
working groups one and five, Languedoc-Roussillon runs working groups three and
four, and Midi-Pyreneés runs groups two and six (Euroregió 1994).
The Euroregion has a relatively broad, multilevel organisation but  limited
resources. With one full-time secretary, it is headquartered in the French Catalan area
of Roussillon, in the town of Perpignan. However, as a form of co-operation the
Euroregió Catalunya, Languedoc-Roussillon i Midi-Pyreneés represents a well-
institutionalised, official, and high governmental level network that involves directly
only members of the governmental, cultural, and scientific elite. There is no
democratically elected body politically in charge of the Euroregion’s activity, but the
officials involved are to some degree accountable to their respective regional
governments. Like most contemporary projects for enhanced regional governance
(Le Galès 1998; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999), Euroregion co-operation becomes
visible to the broader public mainly through the media, and to some degree through
the realisation of concrete projects of general interest (for example, the improvement
of roads crossing the border region).
In dealing with problems caused by the state border for regional development,
Euroregion activities are co-ordinated with another, still broader network for cross-
border co-operation, the Working Community of the Pyrenees (Comunitat de Traball
dels Pirineus, CTP). Founded in November 1983, the CTP is an organisation for co-
operation between the Spanish autonomous communities of Aragon, Catalonia,
Navarra, and the Basque country; the French regions of Aquitania, Languedoc-
Roussillon, and Midi-Pyrenées; and the principality of Andorra (XV Consell Plenari
1997). The CTP consists of a council (with seven representatives from each region),
a co-ordination committee (the regions’ presidents together with the permanent and
special secretary), working commissions (four permanent and three special
commissions focusing on different issue areas), and a secretary (permanent and
special secretaries). The presidency of the CTP is circulated among the participating
regions in two-year terms (Carta d’Acció 1994). The organisation is headquartered
in Jaca (Aragon), where the secretaries are based.
While Euroregion co-operation has had difficulties in getting its voice heard
in the Spanish and the French governments,  the situation is still  worse for the CTP,
which has failed to gain official recognition as an international organisation.
Consequently, the French and Spanish national governments rejected a cross-border
co-operation programme prepared by the CTP. The programme, consisting of
seventeen projects, sought resources from the European Union INTERREG funds,
but the state governments refused to treat it as one totality and instead broke it down
to the composite regional level (XV Consell Plenari 1997: 216). This illustrates the
tendency by national governments to monopolise the formation of official relations
across their boundaries and treat these under the traditional foreign policy concept
(Keating 1998: 182).
Despite these problems, the CTP has the strategic goal of showing the ways
in which the Pyrenees Mountains can function as a uniting rather than a separating
element between the mountain communities. It co-ordinates projects and often
provides them with know-how and partners from the other side of the border, both
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essential requirements for funding from various EU sources, such as the INTERREG,
the Leader, and the Feder programmes (XV Consell Plenari 1997). Like the
Euroregion, the CTP is a well-institutionalised, high-level governmental form of
activity involving numerous prominent actors, but without a directly elected,
democratic, decision-making mechanism.
Together the Euroregion and the CTP frameworks support, initiate, and co-
ordinate dozens of cross-border co-operation projects, ranging from small-scale
initiatives, such as the production of basic information about the area for improved
communication (Atles de l’Euroregió 1995), to lobbying for large-scale
infrastructural projects, such as the high-speed train connection (TGV) from
Barcelona to Montpellier (El Punt 1994). In addition to the Euroregion and the CTP,
there are numerous other inter-regional networks, projects, and initiatives actively
fostering cultural co-operation across the Franco-Spanish border. Among the most
important are the network of Catalan universities based in Perpignan (Xarxa
d’Universitats Institut Joan Lluís Vives), several projects for professional training
funded by the INTERREG II programme (for example, training from export sales
personnel specialising on the context of the Catalan economic region), cross-border
co-operation on annual motor vehicle inspection, and wastewater treatment (Banque
d’experiences 1996).
Additional initiatives for co-operation can be found on the local government
level. For instance, the Pyrenean mountain municipalities have formed an association
for co-operation; the town of Perpignan has established co-operative relations with
Figueres, Lleida, and Girona; and there are numerous ‘sister city’ relations between
the towns of Catalonia and Catalunya Nord (Roig 1997). The numerous public-
private or civic associations’ initiatives include cross-border co-operation between
the chambers of commerce and between the symphony orchestras of Empordà and
Languedoc-Roussillon; a network for transpyrenean studies; an institute for studies
on the borderlands of the Cerdanya valley (Institut d’Estudis Ceretans); and a joint
programme for tourism studies among the universities of Girona, Perpignan, and
Montpellier (El Punt 1999).
There are literally dozens of initiatives and projects for cross-border co-
operation between Catalonia and the regions north of the Franco-Spanish border.
This is clearly in accordance with the Generalitat’s policy, directed outward and
stressing the connection of Catalonia to the north rather than to the rest of Spain. The
policy reflects the ideology of the Convergence and Union Party (Convergencia I
Unió), and especially the ideas of its founder, President Jordi Pujol. He has for long
argued for a distinctive Catalan identity rooted in the European past and giving rise
to nationalism that does not seek independence but nevertheless is capable of
developing within a larger state containing other national minorities (Pujol 1991; cf.
Guibernau 1997: 106). Thus, in a manner closely reminiscent of that of Manuel
Castells (1997), Pujol projects Catalonia and Catalanism as a model for Europe, a
new concept of nation that perhaps can resolve political tensions caused by the
European integration process and the erosion of the sovereign nation-state. Essential
for the realisation of this ideology are the networks of co-operation across the
boundaries of the Catalan political territory.
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Catalunya Nord in the Schengen Era
Many projects for cross-border co-operation in Catalonia involve partners from
outside the immediate border area. The ‘Four Motors for Europe’ network, bringing
together the regions of Catalonia, Baden-Württemberg, Lombardia, and Rhône-
Alpes, is perhaps the most commonly cited example (Murphy 1993). However, in
view of the changing role of European state boundaries, together with the ideas of a
progressive form of nationalism in Catalonia, it is particularly interesting to focus on
the relationship between Catalonia and Catalunya Nord.
As  mentioned  previously,  a  portion  of  the  Catalan  territory  was  annexed  to
France in the 1656 Treaty of the Pyrenees. This area can be named differently
depending on the perspective adopted. In France the area is officially called Pyrénées
Orientales, which in no way refers to the Catalan tradition in the region. An
alternative name is Roussillon, a  name  that  was  given  to  the  area  when  it  was
annexed to France, and which therefore recognises the particular political history of
the region. It is also the latter part of the official name of the larger region of
Languedoc-Roussillon. The term Catalunya Nord is evidently the most Catalan
name, pointing explicitly at the area as part of a larger Catalan totality. The term has
gained increasing popularity since the 1970s among politicians, businesspeople, and
cultural activists, who have sought to strengthen their contacts and relations with the
Spanish Catalonia, the el Principat. Although the Catalan term Catalunya Nord
specifically refers to a vantage point from the Spanish side of the border, it is more
and more commonly used also on the French side (La Vanguardia 1992).
Catalan culture and language have had difficulty flourishing in France, where
the state has traditionally left little room for minority languages. Especially after laws
on compulsory education in French were passed in 1885, the use of Catalan began to
decrease, and the trend has continued to date. In a 1997 study by the regional council
of Languedoc-Roussillon, only 17 percent of those interviewed could speak Catalan
well, and 34 percent with some difficulty (Avui 1998). However, during the last three
decades a renewed interest in the Catalan tradition has emerged in the area. There are
several associations that seek to promote the traditional language and culture in
Catalunya Nord. One of them is Centre de Documentació I Animacio de la Cultura
Catalana, which organises language courses and language services in Catalan and has
a library with some thirty-five thousand volumes written in Catalan (El Punt 1999).
Since 1972 it has also been possible to teach Catalan three hours per week in public
schools, and the privately organised Escola Bressola schools  and  the Arrels school
are fully bilingual. The numbers learning the language are still small, however; in
1995 the private schools had only some two hundred students (1 percent of school
children). Only 15 percent of the children were studying Catalan in public schools
(Verdaguer 1997).
In Catalunya Nord there is one radio station (Ràdio Arrels) broadcasting for
Catalan speakers twenty-four hours per day, and French television has very little
programming in Catalan. However, the Catalan television channels TV3 and Canal
33, broadcast from the Spanish side of the border, can be seen in the area. Some
newspapers and journals are available in Catalan, and interestingly, the Spanish
Catalan newspaper El Punt was circulated in Catalunya Nord in 1987 and is now re-
entering the market on the French side (El Punt 1999). In addition to the media and
Author’s copy. Originally published in Kaplan, D. & Häkli, J. (eds.) Boundaries and Place: European
borderlands in geographical context. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield (2002), 70-92.
11
11
education, signs of an emerging Catalanism have surfaced in decisions made by some
of the region’s institutional actors. For example, the city of Perpignan (in Catalan
Perpinyà) has begun to publish city council bulletins in both French and Catalan (El
Punt 1994). The city has also encouraged the use of Catalan in postal services,
popularised the slogan ‘Perpinyà, la catalana’, and set up a particular body for
Catalan affairs (La Vanguardia 1992). Twenty-two municipalities in Catalunya Nord
have decided to review their land registers and change some place names from French
back to their original Catalan form (El Punt 1993).
A significant event in the popular realm was the 1998 success of Perpignan’s
rugby team, USAP, which managed to fight its way to the finals of the national
league. In the finals Catalan flags were waved and the players took pride in their
‘Catalan-ness’. The latter is an important departure from the typically subordinate
position the Catalan language and culture have occupied in relation to the dominant
French culture (O’Brien 1993). With success in sports, the region’s economic
peripherality and cultural stigma were turned into a victory, one that was joyfully
flagged by the popular Catalan hymn la Estaca (La Semaine en Roussillon 1999).
The renaissance of Catalan language and culture in Catalunya Nord has given
a boost to the symbolic construction of a particular Catalan border landscape. The
standard elements of this landscape include flags and banners with the colours and
stripes of Catalonia, street signs with place names in Catalan, and narratives that
depict traditional connections to the south. However, more concrete developments
influencing the function and meaning of the Franco-Spanish border took place after
Spain joined the EU in 1986. (France became a member of the EEC in 1957.) Since
then, the border has become increasingly permeable, with two major developments.
First, Spain signed the Schengen Agreement in November 1991, which abolished
checks on persons at the Franco-Spanish border. Second, the Single European
Market entered into force in January 1993, establishing the free movement of goods,
services, and capital (Serra del Pino and Ventura i Ribal 1999). Consequently, from a
border-crossing perspective, the border is practically nonexistent, even though it still
separates two states from each other. The freedom of movement has the potential to
encourage cross-border regionalisation in the Catalan borderlands, and in fact there
are some signs of an emerging interest among businesses and consumers in the
markets on the other side of the border (Lluís 1995). Unfortunately, some localities
near the now-redundant border-crossing points have suffered substantial job losses
because of the removal of customs formalities. It has been estimated that before 1993
as many as four thousand people were directly or indirectly employed by border
formalities on the Spanish side alone (Wirth 1992). Currently only non-EU traffic,
approximately 5 percent of all border crossings, is subject to customs formalities, and
only a fraction of the previous jobs are necessary (Rivas 1994: 6). Understandably,
those who lost their good jobs in the customs and related industries may not always
think positively about the disappearance of the border.
In view of a potentially emerging cross-border identity, capturing both the
Spanish and the French sides of the Catalan cultural area, the recent manifestations of
Catalanism in Catalunya Nord are an interesting development. Furthermore, with the
relaxed border control between France and Spain since 1993, economic integration
across the border has gained more momentum than perhaps ever before since the
mid-seventeenth century. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that not
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all people living in Catalunya Nord are enthusiastic about Catalanism. Some
commentators have pointed out that the recent revival of Catalanism in southern
France has been over-interpreted in nationalistic terms, and that on the French side of
the border the Catalan culture is merely a regional label without any broader political
implications or wish to challenge the unity of the French state (El Triangle 1999).
Furthermore, studies have shown that the Catalan identity is more exclusive in Spain
than in France, where it is common for people to view themselves as French and
Catalan (O’Brien 1993: 110). Whatever the case, it is clear that Catalan culture and
symbols have experienced a renaissance in Catalunya Nord. The question that
remains is whether the emerging linguistic and cultural linkages, together with the
many networks for cross-border co-operation, are enough to foster cultural and
political integration across the Franco-Spanish border and thus create a platform for
an emerging cross-border identity.
Neither France Nor Spain?
To chart the borderlanders’ knowledge of and attitudes towards the deepening co-
operation across the Franco-Spanish border and their opinions about the
disappearance of the state boundary, 283 people were interviewed in Catalonia and
77 in Catalunya Nord. The interview was conducted according to a structured
questionnaire, which contained questions about border crossings (how often and
why); the end of border control between Spain and France (Is it positive or
negative?); expectations for the future (Will the border persist or disappear
completely?); cross-border co-operation (Should it exist or not?); the forms of co-
operation (which ones people know about, and to what depth); and finally, what
place name best describes that side of the border (region or state) where the person
lives, the other side, and the borderlands as a whole.
Interviews were conducted in August 1999 in most counties (comarques)
adjacent to or relatively proximate to the border, as well as in the major cities. In
Catalonia the comarques of Cerdanya, Garrotxa, Alt Empordà, Pla de l’Estany, Baix
Empordà, and Selva, as well as the cities of Barcelona, Girona, Tarragona, and
Lleida, were included. In Catalunya Nord the interviews were done in Cerdagne,
Vallespir, and Roussillon, as well as in the city of Perpignan. People were selected
randomly, and the interviews were carried out literally on the street during the day
time, including lunch time (siesta), so that actively working people could also be
reached.
The results of the interviews reveal that the increasing permeability of the
state boundary, brought about by European integration, is generally viewed in
positive terms. Two out of three persons interviewed said that the abolition of border
control had been a favourable development. Some differences across the border were
found: In Catalonia the share of positive answers was somewhat greater than in
Catalunya Nord (see table 5.1, question 1). The most frequently given reason for a
positive attitude toward a more relaxed border control was that it has made border
crossing much easier and quicker. Feelings of being European and having more
freedom also were often mentioned. However, some interviewees both in Catalonia
and in Catalunya Nord did  not  think  that  the  permeable  border  was  anything  to  be
particularly happy about. When asked why, people typically referred to problems with
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drugs, smuggling, immigration, and crime, which all can now cross the border more
easily than before. The reasons given were very similar on both sides of the border.
Judging from the results of the interviews, it is clear that people living in the
Catalan borderlands also think positively about co-operation across the border. Both
in Catalonia and in Catalunya Nord the clear majority thought that co-operation is a
good thing, and only a fraction of the interviewees viewed co-operation negatively
(see table 5.1, question 2). A closer analysis did not reveal much variation according
to the proximity of localities to the border. Interestingly, the only exception could be
found in Cerdanya Valley, where the share of people with positive attitudes towards
cross-border co-operation remained on a lower level than anywhere else. In Cerdanya
(on the Spanish side), only 63 percent of those interviewed thought positively about
co-operation, and in the French Cerdagne the respective share was not higher than 56
percent. This most likely reflects the tense relations among people living in the
Cerdanya Valley, which historically has often been a zone of conflict between villages
and nationalities. Similar observations have been made in other studies on the valley
(Sahlins 1988; 1989; Mancebo 1999). However, in other locales cross-border co-
operation was more appreciated, the positive replies varying between 72 and 99
percent.
Table 5.1 Results of the Survey at the Catalan Borderlands
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However, the interviews also revealed that despite all the publicity in newspapers and
other media, people do not generally know much about concrete co-operation across
the Franco-Spanish border in Catalonia (see table 5.1, question 3). Although more
than half of those interviewed in Catalonia and in Catalunya Nord knew  some
existing forms of cross-border co-operation, the ones mentioned were most often
‘sister cities’, ‘cultural exchange’, or ‘sports events’. A list of cross-border co-
operation  projects  was  also  introduced,  consisting  of  the  following  projects:  the
Euroregion, the CTP, Universitat Catalana d’Estiu, CeDACC, Institut d'Estudies
Ceretans, Diada de Cerdanya, ‘Four Motors for the Europe’, Forum Civil Euromed,
and sister cities co-operation. Of these, by far the most commonly known were the
Universitat Catalana d’Estiu (65 percent) and the sister cities co-operation (68
percent), the former because it is a forum for Catalanist politics with a prominent
place in the media, and the latter most likely because there are signs in many places
telling about amicable relations between ‘Ciutats agermanades’. Understandably, in
localities closer to the border people were generally more aware of cross-border co-
operation than were those farther away from the border. For example, in Alt
Empordà some 70 percent of the interviewed people were aware of some form of co-
operation, whereas only 39 percent in Tarragona and 48 percent in Barcelona did so.
In Catalunya Nord the  same  pattern  was  found.  In  the  French  Cerdagne  some  78
percent of the interviewees knew about some kind of cross-border co-operation,
while in Perpignan only 55 percent did. In all, proximity to the border seems to
encourage people's interest in cross-border co-operation.
When asked if they know how cross-border co-operation functions in
practice, the majority of people answered in the negative (see table 5.1, question 3).
Between Catalonia and Catalunya Nord there  was  no  significant  difference  in  the
share of negative answers; only a few were fully knowledgeable about co-operation
practices. The lack of knowledge about cross-border politics is still more striking.
When people were asked if they would know how to participate in decision making
concerning cross-border co-operation, the overwhelming majority answered
negatively (see table 5.1, question 5).
Despite the mainly positive attitudes towards the increasing permeability of
the Franco-Spanish boundary, as well as towards cross-border co-operation, some
questions revealed that the dividing function of the state boundary between Catalonia
and Catalunya Nord is still very much the reality for many people. For example,
when asked about expectations concerning the complete disappearance of the border,
people showed much more hesitation than might have been expected (see table 5.1,
question 6).
The perception of the boundary as a divider is even more explicit in answers
to the question of what place names best describe the two sides of the border (region
or state) seen from where the interviewed person lives. Although the answers could
well have illustrated an understanding of the borderlands as in principle one unity, the
opposite  was  most  often  the  case.  In  Catalonia  only  some  20  percent  of  the
interviewees used an integrative term for describing the other side of the border (for
example, Catalunya or Catalunya Nord). Some 18 percent made reference to
Catalonia, but as part of France (for example, Catalunya Francesa),  and  as  62
percent viewed the other side in strictly national terms (França). In Catalunya Nord
the results were respectively 22 percent using an integrative term (Catalunya or
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Catalunya Sur), 21 percent referring to Catalonia as part of Spain (Catalogne
Espanyola), and 57 percent referring to a distinct national territory (Espagne).
However, the fact that some 32 percent of those interviewed were actually able to
find a name for the borderlands as a whole can be interpreted as a manifestation of a
potential for emerging identifications across the border. Yet in almost half of the
cases the term used was ‘Pyrenees’ instead of ‘Catalonia’ or els Països Catalans,
which indicates that the unity of the borderlands is often seen in terms of physical
landscape rather than cultural or political environment.
Conclusion
In the light of this research, it seems justifiable to claim that Catalonia is a model for
the ‘New Europe’. Its political leaders, economic actors, and cultural elites are
eagerly entering into relations of co-operation with actors and institutions outside
Catalonia. An untiring advocate of pactism, Jordi Pujol has consistently emphasised
the willingness of the Catalan government to favour networks of co-operation for
enhanced self-government, rather than to strive for national separatism. However,
this willingness cannot be explained by the Catalan political tradition only. The
practical goals of policy making play an equally important role here (Genieys 1998;
Häkli 1999). Economic, cultural, and political actors can enhance their resources for
collective attainment of goals by entering into co-operative relations and networks
with other actors. Following Bob Jessop (1995), these activities can be interpreted as
instances of multiscale regional governance, serving the attempts to attain collective
goals in and through specific configurations of governmental and nongovernmental
institutions, organisations, and practices. The goals are typically economic, but they
can also be cultural and political. And as in Catalonia, cross-border co-operation and
transregional networks are sometimes found more attractive than mere domestic
ones.
In this respect Castells’s (1997) idea about Catalonia as an exemplary case
among the European regions seems to be well founded. We can look at the numerous
projects for cross-border co-operation and regionalisation and create different
scenarios about their role in the emerging new political order in Europe. However, it
is much less clear whether support can be found for claims according to which
Catalonia also presents a model for a new kind of nationalism or cultural identity in
Europe. Rather, in the light of this research, as well as many other studies of
borderland identities (O'Dowd and Wilson 1996; Newman and Paasi 1998; Wilson
and Donnan 1998), it seems that the existence of networks for cross-border co-
operation will not necessarily lead to the rapid erosion of political and cultural
identities connected to the history of the modern nation-state. They may simply add
new layers or dimensions to European governance, which, depending on the social,
cultural, and economic context, may or may not function as an important political
arena. This is because networking tends to follow its own functional and institutional
logic, which typically remains unconnected to people’s everyday concerns. The fact
that  only  a  few  people  in  Catalonia  and Catalunya Nord know how cross-border
projects operate or how to participate in the politics of regionalisation across the
state border lends little support to the idea of an increasing awareness of shared
political goals across the Catalan borderlands.
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What can be safely concluded is that while the European political space is
definitely going through multiple changes, these are experienced differently in
different borderlands. Even though it is more and more easy to (physically) cross the
(internal) borders of the integrated Europe, in many places the borders sit tight as
cultural and/or imaginary dividers between national cultures. Studies on boundaries
and identities have convincingly shown that state borders are essential for the
establishment and negotiation of national identities. Therefore, in Michael Billig’s
(1995: 60) terms, to remove the Franco-Spanish border would require the dissolution
of the forms of life that produce and reproduce ‘Frenchness’ and ‘Spanishness’ in the
Catalan borderlands. Despite the many cross-border networks emerging in Catalonia,
this is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future.
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